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OF CRIMINAL INTENT AND USE OF REASONABLE CARE

No DEFENSE TO STATUTORY NUISANCES-State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roof-

ing Co.,

-

Minn.

-,

246 N.W.2d 692 (1976).

Nuisance law is one area of law that has traditionally been used to
deal with environmental concerns.' The law concerning public nuisance
has served as a flexible and convenient tool for public officials in controlling a wide range of social problems.2 The case of State v. Lloyd A. Fry
Roofing Co.3 is a recent example of the use of public nuisance law to
control smoke emissions within a city. In Fry, the Minnesota Supreme
Court upheld the criminal conviction of the Fry Company' on five violations of a city ordinance5 that prohibited, as a nuisance, the emission of
substances into the open air if "by reason of their objectionable properties . . . they . . .[c]reate an obnoxious odor in the atmosphere.",
The major issue on appeal was whether the state must prove that the
defendant had intended to commit the violations and had failed to do
all that it reasonably could to avert the nuisance.! The Fry Company
1. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 55 (D. Minn.)
(injunction issued against industrial dumpings into Lake Superior), modified on other
grounds, 490 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.), motion for stay of injunction granted,498 F.2d 1073 (8th
Cir.), successive motions to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911, 419 U.S. 802, 420 U.S. 1000

(1974), modified on other grounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Heller v. American Range
Corp., 182 Minn. 286, 288, 234 N.W. 316, 317 (1931) (abatement of operation emitting lead
oxide dust into the air); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 125-26, 130
N.W. 545, 546-47 (1911) (conviction for allowing emission of dense smoke within city
limits); City of St. Paul v. Haugbro, 93 Minn. 59, 61, 100 N.W. 470, 471 (1904) (same).
See generally Note, Air Pollution Control In Minnesota, 54 MINN. L. REv. 953, 961-62
(1970).
2. Nuisance law has been used as a social control regarding such diverse problems as
air pollution, see, e.g., State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 125-26, 130 N.W.
545, 546-47 (1911), and disorderly houses, see, e.g., State v. Wheeler, 131 Minn. 308, 311,
155 N.W. 90, 92 (1915). See note 13 infra and accompanying text.
3. Minn. , 246 N.W.2d 692 (1976).
4. The Fry Company operates an asphalt roofing plant in a mixed industrial-residential
area of northern Minneapolis, zoned for heavy industry. The company has been operating
in the area since 1947 and has been the subject of other litigation concerning the emission
of smoke and asphalt odors from its smokestack. See, e.g., State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing
Co., - Minn. __, 246 N.W.2d 696 (1976) (action brought to compel defendant to
conduct stack emission tests); State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 280 Minn. 265, 158
N.W.2d 851 (1968) (defendant found guilty of violating ordinance prohibiting emission of
obnoxious odors). In the present case, defendant was convicted in a municipal court and
fined $1,000. The conviction was appealed to and affirmed by the district court.
5. MINNEAPOUS, MINN., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 47.180 (1976) (formerly MINNEAPOUS,
MINN., CODE OF ORDnIANCES § 180.015 (1960)).
6. Id. The complaint was based on air pollution emanating from defendant's smokestack; smoke had settled in the surrounding residential and recreational areas. -Minn.
at -, 246 N.W.2d at 694.
7. See Minn. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 694. Two minor issues were also raised:
whether the evidence to sustain defendant's conviction was sufficient and whether the city
inspector's agreement to notify defendant prior to issuance of violation tags precluded
prosecution. Id. The court concluded that the evidence presented to the lower courts was
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argued that the mere fact that obnoxious odors were emitted from its
smokestack did not establish a violation because the state must prove
criminal intent and lack of due care.' The state contended that the
obnoxious smoke emissions were violations per se, regardless of the Fry
Company's intent or steps taken to avert the nuisance.' The court
adopted the state's position, concluding that the company's conduct
was a nuisance per se. 10
At common law, nuisances can be private or public." Private nuisance
involves the interference with an individual's use and enjoyment of his
private property." Public nuisance involves the interference with interests common to the general public.2 Actionable nuisance requires a
substantial and unreasonable interference with either the use and enjoysufficient to sustain the conviction, id., and that the agreement between defendant and
the city inspector was not binding upon the city and could not circumscribe the city's
power to prosecute, id. at -,
246 N.W.2d at 696.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at -,
246 N.W.2d at 695.
11. See, e.g., 1 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 1.23, at 64 (1956); Boger,
The Common Law of Public Nuisance in State Environmental Litigation, 4 ENVT'L Anw.
367, 368 (1975); Comment, Nuisance or Negligence: A Study in the Tyranny of Labels,
24 IND. L.J. 402, 403 (1949).
12. E.g., Schmidt v. Village of Mapleview, 293 Minn, 106, 108, 196 N.W.2d 626, 628
(1972) (fire hydrant near private driveway interfered with access to property); Jedneak v.
Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 228, 234 N.W. 326, 328 (1942) (lead oxide dust
blown onto plaintiff's property from enameling plant); Roukovina v. Island Farm
Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 337-38, 200 N.W. 350, 351 (1924) (operation of ice crusher
and loading of milk wagons during sleeping hours); Dorman v. Ames, 12 Minn. 451, 461
(Gil. 347, 360) (1867) (erection of dam caused overflow of water onto neighboring property); Boger, supra note 11, at 368. See generally W. PRosSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
Tors § 89 (4th ed. 1971). See also MINN. STAT. § 561.01 (1976) (statutory prohibition of
private nuisance).
Private nuisances include interferences with the physical condition of the land, such as
blasting, flooding, or water pollution; interferences with the comfort or convenience of the
occupant, such as foul odors, excessive noise or light, and repeated telephone calls; and
interferences with the occupant's health and peace of mind, such as a malarial pond and
the depressing effect of a funeral parlor. W. PROSSER, supra, at 591-92.
13. See, e.g., Excelsior Baking Co. v. City of Northfield, 247 Minn. 387, 393, 77 N.W.2d
188, 192 (1956) (door-to-door solicitation); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn.
122, 125-26, 130 N.W. 545, 546-47 (1911) (burning of soft coal within city limits); MINN.
STAT. § 609.74 (1976); J. MACDONALD & J. CONWAY, ENVIRONmENTAL LITIGATION § 2.07, at
21 (1972); Boger, supra note 11, at 368; Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
VA. L. REv. 997, 999 (1966). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 88. See also MINN.
STAT. § 609.745 (1976) (prohibition against permitting public nuisance).
Public nuisances include interferences with the public health, such as the keeping of a
hogpen, diseased animals, or a malarial pond; interferences with public safety, such as
storing explosives, shooting fireworks in the streets, keeping dangerous animals, and the
unlicensed practice of medicine; interferences with public morals, such as houses for
prostitution or gambling, indecent exhibitions, bullfights, unlicensed prize fights, or public profanity; and interferences with public peace, comfort, and convenience, such as loud
disturbances, foul odors, smoke, and the blocking of a public highway or navigable stream.
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 88, at 583-84.
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ment of private property rights or the public welfare;" a substantial and
unreasonable interference is determined by such factors as the nature
and extent of the harm, 5 the possibility of averting the harm, 1" the social
utility of the conduct, 7 and the setting in which the conduct took
place."
Today most state legislatures have enacted general public nuisance
statutes that essentially restate the common law. 9 In addition, a state
14. See, e.g., Fish v. Hanna Coal & Ore Corp., 164 F. Supp. 870, 872 (D. Minn. 1958)
(interference must be material and substantial, as measured by sensibilities of ordinary
people of that locality); Jedneak v. Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 229, 4
N.W.2d 326, 328 (1942) (only the substantial and material phase of a nuisance, as compared to the ordinary discomforts to living in the area, may be enjoined); Heller v. American Range Corp., 182 Minn. 286, 288, 234 N.W. 316, 317 (1931) (zinc oxide dust considered
a serious interference with enjoyment of property); Millett v. Minnesota Crushed Stone
Co., 145 Minn. 475, 477, 177 N.W. 641, 641 (1920) (conduct must interfere materially to
be actionable); F. HARPER & F. JAMES, supra note 11, § 1.26, at 79 (annoyance caused by
air pollution must be material and substantial to be unreasonable); Boger, supra note 11,
at 368 (unreasonable and substantial invasion).
15. See Marshall v. Consumers Power Co., 65 Mich. App. 237, 265, 237 NW.2d 266,
279 (1975) (character, volume, time, and duration of nuisance); Roukovina v. Island
Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 338, 200 N.W. 350, 351 (1924) (character and extensiveness
of a business are factors to be considered in determining whether that business constitutes
a nuisance); cf. Note, Enjoininga Public Nuisance, 7 NAT. RESOuRcEs LAW. 157, 159 (1974)
(character and extent of harm considered in balancing equities for injunctive relief).
16. See Jedneak v. Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 230-31, 4 N.W.2d 326,
329 (1942) (industry has the duty to use devices which minimize the effect of the alleged
nuisance; 'Tihe cost of a change, the probability of betterment and the effect upon
performance were all factors which any industry should consider in determining whether
to experiment with devices other than those now in use."); cf. Note, supra note 15, at 159
(impracticability of preventing the invasion is equitable consideration in action for injunctive relief).
17. See Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 338, 200 N.W. 350,
35.1 (1924) (whether defendant's business is lawful and useful are to be considered in
determining the existence of an abatable nuisance); Note, supra note 15, at 159.
18. See Jedneak v. Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 230, 4 N.W.2d 326, 328
(1942) (smoke, cinders, and coal dust from defendant's plant located in heavily industrialized area held not to constitute a nuisance; residents living in areas zoned for industry
cannot expect the same freedom from air pollution as those who live in residential areas);
City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 299, 31 N.W. 49, 50 (1886) (existence of public
nuisance depends on locality and surroundings); Note, supra note 15, at 159. See generally
Comment, Enjoining PrivateNuisances: Considerationof the PublicInterest, 43 U. CoLo.
L. REv. 225 (1971).
19. Prosser, supra note 13, at 999. For example, MINN. STAT. § 561.01 (1976) provides
in part, concerning a private nuisance: "Anything which is injurious to health or indecent
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere
with the confortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance ....
"
Similarly, MINN. STAT. § 609.74 (1976) provides in part, concerning public nuisance:
Whoever by his act or failure to perform a legal duty intentionally does any
of the following is guilty of maintaining a public nuisance, which is a misdemeanor:
(1) Maintains or permits a condition which unreasonably annoys, injures or
endangers the safety, health, morals, comfort, or repose of any considerable
Published by Mitchell
Hamline
Open Access, 1978
number of members of the public . ...
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legislature may declare specific actions to be public nuisances, and
may empower municipalities to pass and enforce ordinances to the same
effect." The legislatures are limited, however, in that they cannot declare something to be a nuisance which could not in fact be a nuisance,2
nor can they create arbitrary classifications in passing such legislation.2
At common law, the commission of a public nuisance constituted a
crime. 4 Similarly, once the legislative body declares an act to be a
nuisance, conduct in violation of that law constitutes a criminal nui25
sance, nuisance per se, or nuisance at law. This was the position taken
Other state legislatures have also passed nuisance statutes. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. §
657.1 (West 1950); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-10-1 to -3 (1967).
20. Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 491-92 (1916) (state
legislature may declare emission of dense smoke to be a nuisance); see, e.g., Barrett v.
Nash Finch Co., 228 Minn. 156, 159, 36 N.W.2d 526, 528 (1949) (state legislature has power
to determine whether a violation of statute constitutes a nuisance); IOWA CODE ANN. §
657.2 (West 1950) (restriction against, inter alia, houses of gambling, prostitution or
narcotics, impeding passage on a river or public road, and water or air pollution).
21. E.g., Northwestern Laundry v. City of Des Moines, 239 U.S. 486, 491-92 (1916)
(state, through authorized municipality, may declare emission of dense smoke to be a
nuisance); see State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 126, 130 N.W. 545, 547
(1911) (city council, under legislative sanction, may restrain production of dense smoke
as a nuisance).
22. State v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 460-62, 219 N.W. 770, 771 (1928) (legislature
cannot declare something to be a nuisance which clearly is not; the inherent nature of
publication of scandalous material bears such a relation to social and moral welfare that
it could be declared a nuisance by legislature); see State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114
Minn. 122, 125-26, 130 N.W. 545, 547 (1911) (legislature may prohibit emission of dense
smoke); City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 300, 31 N.W. 49, 50 (1886) ("dense
smoke" may be declared a nuisance).
However, the Minnesota court has stated that despite this limitation, the legislature
still retains a high degree of discretion. See State v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 460, 219 N.W.
770, 771 (1928).
23. See Claesgens v. Animal Rescue League, Inc., 173 Minn. 61, 64, 216 N.W. 535, 536
(1927) (municipal ordinance prohibiting all dog pounds within city limits held invalid on
its face as arbitrary and unreasonable); Lachtman v. Houghton, 134 Minn. 226, 237, 158
N.W. 1017, 1021 (1916) (ordinance prohibiting property owner from erecting a store building within residential district held unconstitutional); State v. Sheriff of Ramsey County,
48 Minn. 236, 239-40, 51 N.W. 112, 113 (1892) (ordinance prohibiting emission of dense
smoke, excepting certain types of manufacturers, held to be arbitrary and unconstitutional).
24. Culwell v. Abbott Constr. Co., 211 Kan. 359, 363, 506 P.2d 1191, 1195 (1973);
Prosser, supra note 13, at 999.
25. See, e.g., State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 130, 130 N.W. 545, 548
(1911) (emission of dense smoke in city railroad yard, in violation of city ordinance prohibiting such emissions, held to be a nuisance per se).
In Marshall v. Consumers Power Corp., 65 Mich. App. 237, 265, 237 N.W.2d 266, 283
(1975), the court distinguished between a nuisance per se (or nuisance at law) and a
nuisance in fact: a nuisance per se is an act, occupation or structure which is a nuisance
at all times regardless of the attendant circumstances; a nuisance in fact is a nuisance by
reason of circumstances and surroundings. The court concluded that although a future
nuclear power plant would not violate any law or ordinance, and hence could not be a
nuisance per se, it remained to be seen whether the plant would constitute a nuisance in
fact.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/10
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by the Fry court in rejecting the Fry Company's defenses of its lack of
intent to commit the crime and its exercise of reasonable care." In
discussing the intent issue, the court recognized the power of the state
legislature to define crimes without regard to criminal intent or motive."
This is consistent with Minnesota case law, which has generally held
that the legislature need not include criminal intent or motive as an
essential element of a crime.28 When intent is not a part of the statutory
26. See Minn. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 695. A number of other courts have rejected
reasonable care as a defense in a nuisance action. See, e.g., Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg,
232 Iowa 600, 604, 4 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1942) (defendant is liable for creating a nuisance
notwithstanding the exercise of skill and care to prevent any damage); Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 111, 29 N.W.2d 1, 6 (1947) (due care is not a defense where business
operation seriously affects public health and nearby property rights); Johnson v. City of
Fairmont, 188 Minn. 451, 453, 247 N.W. 572, 573 (1933) (nuisance does not depend on the
degree of care used); Lead v. Inch, 116 Minn. 467, 471-72, 134 N.W. 218, 219 (1912)
(reasonable care in operation of horse barn in residential area is no defense if the operation
still results in obnoxious odors); Pearson v. Kansas City, 331 Mo. 885, 894, 55 S.W.2d 485,
489 (1932) ("'Negligence' is the failure to exercise the degree of care required by the
circumstances.... A 'nuisance' does not rest on the degree of care used, but on the
degree of danger existing with the best of care.") (emphasis in original); Commonwealth
v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 496, 509, 353 A.2d 471, 478 (1976) (elements
of negligence do not apply to nuisance law), affl'd, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d 461 (1977). But
see Power v. Village of Hibbing, 182 Minn. 66, 72, 233 N.W. 597, 599 (1930) (negligence is
an unnecessary element in a nuisance action only when the act causing the nuisance is
"unlawful"; defendant's sewers, which flooded when over three inches of rain fell within
45 minutes, did not constitute a nuisance).
27. See Minn. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 695.
28. See, e.g., State v. Everson, 286 Minn. 246, 248, 175 N.W.2d 503, 505 (1970); State
v. Kremer, 262 Minn. 190, 191, 114 N.W.2d 88, 89 (1962); State v. O'Heron, 250 Minn.
83, 85, 83 N.W.2d 785, 786 (1957); State v. Quackenbush, 98 Minn. 515, 521, 108 N.W.
953, 956 (1906); cf. United States v. Hart Motor Express, Inc., 160 F. Supp. 886, 887-88
(D. Minn. 1958) (omission of element of scienter for violation of statutory prohibition held
constitutional).
The United States Supreme Court stated the rationale for imposing strict criminal
liability for certain statutory violations as follows:
The accused, if he does not will the violation, is usually in a position to prevent
it with no more care than society might reasonably expect and no more exertion
than it might reasonably exact from one who assumed his responsibilities. Also,
penalties commonly are relatively small, and conviction does no grave damage
to an offender's reputation.
Morisette v. United States, 242 U.S. 246, 256 (1951). However, in State v. Kremer, 262
Minn. 190, 192, 114 N.W.2d 88, 89 (1962), where defendant did not violate a traffic law
intentionally, the court found that the conviction for the violation was unjustified despite
the absence of a requirement of intent in the statutory language. The court held that the
above quoted language from Morisette did not apply to that situation. See also Haddad,
The Mental Attitude Requirement in CriminalLaw-And Some Expectations,59 J. Cimw.
L.C. & P.S. 4, 17-21 (1968); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. Ray. 55, 55-84
(1933). According to one authority, mens rea, or criminal intent, may not be necessary
where the prohibition is merely regulatory, as opposed to being designed to maintain the
social order, and where the possibility of incarceration for the offense is minimal. Id. at
72. Public nuisance has traditionally been punishable without a showing of mens rea. See
id. at 73.
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prohibition, what must be shown to prove the violation is that the defendant intended to do the act which constituted the crime, not that he
intended to commit the crime." Therefore, in Fry the court required the
state to prove only that the company intentionally operated a plant
which produced obnoxious smoke emissions as a normal incident to its
operation.
The court rejected the Fry Company's argument of reasonable care as
irrelevant." The court based its decision on the distinction between
negligence and nuisance, concluding that the Fry Company ignored this
distinction in its argument. 3 Whereas negligence is a form of action
based on fault or breach of duty,"2 nuisance action is based on an interference with another's use and enjoyment of his land or with some public
interest. 3 Negligence law emphasizes how the defendant has acted;
nuisance law is concerned primarily with the result of the defendant's
activity.Y One source of confusion between these concepts is the reasonableness factor." Conduct must create an unreasonable risk of harm in
29. See DeLahunta v. City of Waterbury, 134 Conn. 630, 634, 59 A.2d 800, 802-03 (1948)
("intent" refers to the intent to bring about the conditions causing the nuisance rather
than the intent to create the nuisance); State v. Everson, 286 Minn. 246, 248, 175 N.W.2d
503, 505 (1970) (to prove intent, it is sufficient that defendant intends the act which
constitutes the crime); Comment, supra note 11, at 407.
30. See Minn. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 695.
31. See id.
32. See Mokovich v. Independent School Dist. No. 22, 177 Minn. 446, 449, 225 N.W.
292, 293 (1929). See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 30.
33. See City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 299, 31 N.W. 49, 50 (1886)
("Anything is a nuisance ... which renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable."); MINN. STAT. § 561.01 (1976) (nuisances); J. MAcDoNALD & J. CONWAY, supra
note 13, § 2.07; W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 86; Boger, supra note 11, at 368. Compare
Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 85, 103 N.W.2d 131, 134 (1960) (the repeated
sales of intoxicating liquor to minors, where the plaintiff was injured by an intoxicated
minor, held not a wrongful invasion of a legal right or interest) and Excelsior Baking Co.
v. City of Northfield, 247 Minn. 387, 393-94, 77 N.W.2d 188, 192-93 (1956) (house-to-house
solicitation of bakery goods held not an annoyance within the meaning of public nuisance)
with Jedneak v. Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 229-30, 4 N.W.2d 326, 328
(1942) (cinders, smoke, and ashes from smokestack held to be a substantial interference
with plaintiff's enjoyment of life) and Millett v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 145 Minn.
475, 476-77, 177 N.W. 641, 641 (1920) (noise, smoke, and dust from operation of limestone
quarry held to interfere materially with physical comfort of neighboring residents) and
State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 126, 130 N.W. 545, 547 (1911) (dense
smoke resulting from the burning of soft coal held to interfere with public comfort, property and health).
34. See Culwell v. Abbott Constr. Co., 211 Kan. 359, 364, 506 P.2d 1191, 1196 (1973)
("INJuisance is a result and negligence is a cause and they cannot be distinguished
otherwise."). Thus, negligence may be thought of as one type of conduct, in addition to
intentional conduct and abnormally dangerous conduct, that can give rise to a nuisance.
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 87, at 573-74; see Mokovich v. Independent School Dist. No.
22, 177 Minn. 446, 449, 225 N.W. 292, 293 (1929).
35. See Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 605, 4 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1942). See
also Commonwealth v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 23 Pa. Commw. Ct. 496, 509, 353 A.2d 471,
478 (1976), aff'd, 472 Pa. 115, 371 A.2d
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/10
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order to constitute negligence, 36 whereas a nuisance involves an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of another's property
rights.37 Reasonableness of the interference has long been a factor in
determining the existence of a common law nuisance. 3 This often requires a balancing of interests: the severity of the injury in light of the
social utility of defendant's conduct" and the cost of eliminating the
alleged nuisance. 0 The Fry Company's argument appears to have been
based on the negligence concept of reasonable care rather than on the
nuisance concept of an unreasonable interference with a public interest.
In holding violations of criminal nuisance statutes to be nuisances per
se, the Fry court highlighted and clarified the distinction between common law and statutory nuisances. In holding a defendant liable for the
commission of a common law nuisance, the court must determine the
existence of a substantial interference, the unreasonableness of that
interference, and the appropriate remedy." In statutory nuisance cases,
36. W. PaossER, supra note 12, § 31, at 145.
37. See, e.g., Excelsior Baking Co. v. City of Northfield, 247 Minn. 387, 393, 77 N.W.2d
188, 192 (1956); Jedneak v. Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 229-30, 4 N.W.2d
326, 328 (1942); Millett v. Minnesota Crushed Stone Co., 145 Minn. 475, 476.77, 177 N.W.
641, 641 (1920); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 126, 130 N.W. 545, 547
(1911); City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 299, 31 N.W. 49, 50 (1886); MINN. STAT.
§ 609.74(1) (1976); W. PsossER, supra note 12, § 87, at 580. The Iowa Supreme Court
explained the difference between unreasonableness as it applies to negligence law and
unreasonableness as it applies to nuisance law:
The unreasonableness of the use, which causes the !!qrm, and the unreasonableness of the injury are, to some extent, related and inust be determined by
reference to all the circumstances. The unreasonablen ess of the conduct is determined largely by the character and gravity of the rasulting injury rather than
the injury threatened. In determining whether conduct is unreasonable in a
nuisance case, the test is not unreasonable risk or foreseeability as those terms
have been used in cases based on negligence. If the conduct causes an unreasonable amount of harm there may be a nuisance even though it created no unreasonable risk of harm.
Ryan v. City of Emmetsburg, 232 Iowa 600, 605, 4 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1942).
38. See, e.g., City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 299, 31 N.W. 49, 50 (1886)
(whether or not dense smoke emitted from chimney is a nuisance depends on the "locality
and surroundings").
39. See Excelsior Baking Co. v. City of Northfield, 247 Minn. 387, 393, 77 N.W.2d 188,
193 (1956) ("public convenience and reasonable necessity are controlling considerations,
and regard must be given to the time, place, and all the other circumstances of a particular
case"); Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 338, 200 N.W. 350, 351
(1924) (operation of ice crusher and milk delivery wagon during normal sleeping hours held
to be a nuisance, despite social utility of the business); notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
40. See Jedneak v. Minneapolis Gen. Elec. Co., 212 Minn. 226, 231-32, 4 N.W.2d 326,
329 (1942); Roukovina v. Island Farm Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 338, 200 N.W. 350,
351 (1924); notes 15-18 supra and accompanying text.
41. See, e.g., United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 380 F. Supp. 11, 55 (D. Minn.),
modified on other grounds, 490 F.2d 688 (8th Cir.), motion for stay of injunction granted,
498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir.), successive motions to vacate stay denied, 418 U.S. 911, 419 U.S.
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however, one could argue that the legislative body has already determined which public interests are worthy of protection and that interferences with those interests are presumptively unreasonable." Therefore,
the court's function is limited to the determination of a violation of the
statute, the constitutionality of the statute, and the selection of a remedy.43 Once an activity is codified as a nuisance and the literal terms of
the ordinance are violated, no other factors need be examined by the
court." Following the Fry decision, a manufacturer will be guilty of a
violation regardless of attempts to avoid the nuisance, if in the end the
nuisance still occurs.
Although the Minnesota courts will not consider a defendant's attempts to avoid the nuisance in determining whether the criminal nuisance statute has been violated, presumably reasonable attempts to
avoid the nuisance would have an effect on the court's determination of
appropriate punishment. Likewise, the defendant's exercise of due care
might bear on the remedy chosen by the court in a civil action for
nuisance.
Real Property-ABANDONMENT OF CONTRACT FOR DEED-Berman v.
247 N.W.2d 405 (1976).
Kieren, Minn. -,
In the law of real property, abandonment refers to the voluntary relinquishment of an interest in land.' Although a perfect legal title may not
802, 420 U.S. 1000 (1974), modified on othergrounds, 514 F.2d 492 (8th Cir. 1975); Note,
supra note 15, at 159; Comment, supra note 18, at 226.
42. See State v. Guilford, 174 Minn. 457, 459-60, 219 N.W. 770, 771 (1928) (prerogative
of the legislature to determine that it was in the public interest to declare distribution of
scandalous material to be a nuisance; the determination by the legislature is presumptively valid, but not conclusive); State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 130,
130 N.W. 545, 547 (1911) (legislature and city council presumed to have all the necessary
facts to make a rational decision on what constitutes a nuisance).
43. See, e.g., State v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911)
(ordinance prohibiting dense smoke from the burning of soft coal upheld as constitutional;
fine imposed on defendant for violating the ordinance); City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36
Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1886) (ordinance prohibiting emission of dense smoke from chimneys held void as unauthorized by the legislature).
246 N.W.2d 692, 695
- Minn ....
44. State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co.,
(1976); H. Christiansen & Sons v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 475, 483, 31 N.W.2d 270,
275 (1948); W. PRossER, supra note 12, § 87, at 576.

1. See Melco Inv. Co. v. Gapp, 259 Minn. 82, 85, 105 N.W.2d 907, 909 (1960) (contract
for deed); Mineral Land Inv. Co. v. Bishop Iron Co., 134 Minn. 412, 414, 159 N.W. 966,
967 (1916) (mineral lease); Norton v. Duluth Transfer Ry., 129 Minn. 126, 131-32, 151
N.W. 907, 909 (1915) (easement). See generally 5 G. THoMpsON, Coamewrrmw ON THE
MODERN LAW OF PROPERTY § 2515 (1957 & Supp. 1976). The principles applicable to a
determination of abandonment of personal property are discussed at some length in Erickson v. Sinykin, 223 Minn. 232, 239-42, 26 N.W.2d 172, 176-77 (1947).
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